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ABSTRACT

As technology has developed, Americans have come to carry their most private
information around with them in their pockets in digital form on their cell phones. A cell phone
has immense storage capacity and can contain a wide variety of communicative information
about its owner. In the past, there had been a disagreement among the lower courts as to whether
police officers could search the contents of an arrestee’s cell phone when making an arrest. The
United States Supreme Court settled this disagreement in Riley v. California; in that case, the
Court held that the warrantless search of a cell phone incident to arrest violated the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. This thesis discusses case law that preceded the
United States Supreme Court case Riley v. California, that decision, and possible ramifications of
that decision.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Riley v. California, 1 there was disagreement
among the lower courts as to whether a cell phone search was part of the lawful exercise of
police powers following an arrest. This disagreement was due to broad interpretations of the
search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment. The United States Courts of
Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, as well as the California, Massachusetts, and
Georgia Supreme Courts held warrantless cell phone searches should be allowed. 2 The United
States Courts of Appeals for the First Circuit, as well as the Florida and Ohio Supreme Courts
held that warrantless cell phone searches should not be allowed. 3
There were three Supreme Court cases which provided precedents for the rules governing
searches incident to arrest. These cases are Chimel v. California, 4 United States v. Robinson, 5
and Arizona v. Gant. 6

1

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). This was a consolidated case. See notes 7-8, infra
and accompanying text.
2

United States v. Flores – Lopez, 670 F. 3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Murphy, 552 F.
3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007); People v. Diaz, 51
Cal. 4th 84 (Cal. 2011); Hawkins v. State, 723 S.E.2d 924 (Ga. 2012); Commonwealth v. Phifer,
979 N.E. 2d 210 (Mass. 2012).

3

United States v. Wurie, 728 F. 3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013); Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d 724 (Fla.
2013); State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St.3d 163 (Ohio 2009).

4

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).

5

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).

6

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).

1

On January 17, 2014, the United States Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of
certiorari for both People v. Riley 7 and United States v. Wurie 8 consolidated to the issue of
whether warrantless cell phone searches incident to arrest were constitutional. On June 25, 2014,
the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Riley v. California. 9 The Supreme Court
held that police cannot search a phone upon arrest without a search warrant. 10
This decision was a shocking advancement from the Supreme Court’s prior stand on
privacy and technology. The revolutionary decision in Riley v. California provided clarity and
unity between Justices which had not been present in prior Supreme Court cases regarding
technology. Significant privacy cases involving technology that were decided by the Supreme
Court prior to this case include Katz v. United States, 11 Smith v. Maryland, 12 Kyllo v. United
States, 13 City of Ontario, California v. Quon, 14 and United States v. Jones. 15

7

People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 999, rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
8

United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 999, aff’d, 134 S.
Ct. 2473 (2014).
9

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). For ease of reference, the consolidated cases will
be referred to as Riley v. California.

10

Id. at 2493.

11

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

12

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).

13

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).

14

City of Ontario, California v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).

15

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).

2

The focus of this thesis will be the Supreme Court decision in Riley v. California. To
provide background information for the reader, the thesis will first review prior case law
interpreting the Fourth Amendment and previous significant Supreme Court cases on privacy.
Next, the thesis will examine the First Circuit decision in United States v. Wurie, and the Fourth
District Court of Appeals of California decision in People v. Riley prior to discussing the United
States Supreme Court case and the possible ramifications.

3

II.

CASE LAW

A. Fourth Amendment Exception for Warrantless Search
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. 16
The fact that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches leads to the question
of what constitutes a reasonable search. This has been determined through case law. In Riley v.
California, the United States Supreme Court referred to its prior decisions in Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton, 17 and Brigham City v. Stuart. 18
In the United States Supreme Court case Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 19 the
Supreme Court stated, “[w]here a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover
evidence of criminal wrongdoing, this Court has said that reasonableness generally requires the
obtaining of a judicial warrant.” 20 Thus, the starting point in considering interpretation of the

16

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

17

Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).

18

Brighham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006).

19

Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).

20

Id. at 653.

4

Fourth Amendment is that a warrant is generally required. The Court elaborated on this by
stating:
As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the
constitutionality of a governmental search is “reasonableness.” At least in a case
such as this, where there was no clear practice, either approving or disapproving
the type of search at issue, at the time the constitutional provision was
enacted, whether a particular search meets the reasonableness standard “is judged
by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” 21
However, in the United States Supreme Court case Brigham City v. Stuart, 22 the Court
recognized exceptions to the general rule. The Court held that a warrant is not needed for all
searches. The Supreme Court stated, “because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment
is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” 23
As provided in Brigham City v. Stuart, case law exceptions to the Fourth Amendment
permit a police officer to conduct a search without first obtaining a warrant. These exceptions
have been applied to a police officer bringing a suspect into custody and allow a police officer to
conduct a search incident to arrest in specific situations. The three United States Supreme Court
cases which set precedent for an arrest-related search are Chimel v. California, 24 United States v.

21

Id at 652.

22

Brighham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006).

23

Id. at 403.

24

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).

5

Robinson, 25 and Arizona v. Gant. 26 The Court decided the first two cases within a space of four
years, but the gap between the second and third was more than thirty five years.

1. Chimel v. California
In the United States Supreme Court case Chimel v. California, police officers searched
Ted Steven Chimel’s entire three bedroom house, including the attic, garage and workshop
following his arrest. 27 The officers went as far as to go through the contents of drawers during
the search which took between 45 minutes and an hour. 28
The modern search-incident-to-arrest doctrine was created in Chimel v. California. In
Chimel, the United States Supreme Court stated:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the
person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in
order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well
be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable
for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's
person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. 29
This means that, in order for a search-incident-to-arrest to be constitutional, it must be meant to
either protect the officer from harm or prevent evidence from being destroyed. These two
reasons for allowing searches without warrants are carried forward in Robinson and Gant.

25

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).

26

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).

27

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 754.

28

Id.

29

Id. at 762-63.
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2. United States v. Robinson
In the United States Supreme Court case United States v. Robinson, 30 the Court used the
rationale from Chimel 31 to determine whether a search of an arrestee’s person incident to arrest
was reasonable.
In Robinson, a police officer stopped Wille Robinson, Jr. because the officer believed
Robinson was driving with a revoked operator’s permit. 32 During the patdown at the time of
Robinson’s arrest, the officer felt an object in Robinson’s left breast pocket. 33 The officer
removed the object from Robinson’s pocket and discovered it was a pack of cigarettes. 34
However, the officer stated he still did not know what was inside the cigarette pack. 35 Upon
looking inside the cigarette pack, he discovered it contained fourteen gelatin capsules of
heroin. 36
Based on the rationale used in Chimel, it is necessary for a police officer to search an
arrestee’s person in order to locate possible weapons and preserve any evidence which could be

30

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).

31

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).

32

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 221.

33

Id. at 222.

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id.

7

destroyed. 37 The Supreme Court held that the search of Robinson’s person and seizure of the
heroin were permissible under the Fourth Amendment. 38 The Court stated:
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion
under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the
arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which
establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful
custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under
that Amendment. 39

3. Arizona v. Gant
In the United States Supreme Court case Arizona v. Gant, 40 the Court used the rationale
from Chimel 41 to determine the constitutionality of searching an arrestee’s vehicle incident to
arrest. The search incident to arrest exception had been left open-ended prior to this decision.
In Gant, police officers found cocaine in a jacket pocket in the backsat of Rodney Gant’s
vehicle during a search following his arrest for driving with a suspended license. 42 Gant had been
arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car prior to the beginning of the search. 43
The United States Supreme Court held that the search in this case was unreasonable. 44
The Supreme Court stated:
37

Id. at 225.

38

Id. at 236.

39

Id. at 235.

40

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).

41

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).

42

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. at 335.

43

Id.
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Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the
arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of
the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the
offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee's
vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another
exception to the warrant requirement applies. 45
Because Gant had been secured in the back of a patrol car prior to the search, there was
no way he could have reached inside the car while the search was occurring. This comes
down to the arrestee having access to the contents of the vehicle.

B.

Previous Significant Supreme Court Privacy Cases

The United States Supreme Court hears only a very small number of all the cases from
across the United States every year. Prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in Riley v.
California,46 very few cases had been decided on the relationship between privacy and
technology. These cases included Katz v. United States, 47 Smith v. Maryland, 48 Kyllo v. United
States, 49 City of Ontario, California v. Quon, 50 and United States v. Jones. 51 Many of these cases
involved now outdated technology or technology that was quite different from cell phone

44

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S at 351.

45

Id.

46

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473.

47

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

48

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).

49

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).

50

City of Ontario, California v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).

51

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).

9

searches. These cases made it extremely difficult to predict how the Supreme Court would rule in
Riley v. California.

1. Katz v. United States
In Katz v. United States, 52 the United States Supreme Court stated that, “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.” 53 In this case, the FBI attached an electronic listening
device to the outside of a phone booth and recorded the conversations that occurred inside. 54
The government argued that because there was no physical trespass into the area occupied by
Katz no violation to the Fourth Amendment occurred; however, the Supreme Court did not
agree.
The concurring opinion in Katz created the two prong test, which has since become the
test used to tell if a warrantless search is constitutional. This test states, “there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.” 55

2. Smith v. Maryland
In the United States Supreme Court case, Smith v. Maryland, 56 the police requested that a
pen register be installed at the phone company’s central office to record the telephone numbers

52

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

53

Id. at 351.

54

Id. at 348.

55

Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).

56

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).

10

dialed from the petitioner’s home. 57 In Smith, the court held that the search was constitutional
because the pen register had extremely limited capabilities. Because the police were only
accessing the numbers dialed from the phone rather than communicative information, it was not
reasonable for the petitioner to believe this information was private because it was socially
accepted that the telephone company had access to this information. 58
3. Kyllo v. United States
In the United States Supreme Court case, Kyllo v. United States, 59 police used a thermal
imager to scan Danny Kyllo’s home in order to detect the heat from lights used to grow
marijuana. The police found that the roof over the garage and wall of the petitioner’s home was
relatively hot in comparison to the rest of the house and the other homes in the triplex.60 The
Court was concerned with the lack of limits on the powers of technology to shrink citizen’s
constitutional right to privacy. 61
The United States Supreme Court held that, “[w]here . . . the Government uses a device
that is not in general public use, to explore details of a private home that would previously have
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a Fourth Amendment ‘search,’
and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.” 62 The Court considered the use of a
57

Id. at 737.

58

Id. at 745.

59

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).

60

Id. at 30.

61

Id. at 34.

62

Id. at 27.
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thermal imager, which only showed the temperature of the outside of the house in comparison
with the other homes in the triplex, to violate the petitioner’s Fourth Amendment right. In Kyllo,
although the officers remained on a public street, they “engaged in more than naked-eye
surveillance of a home.” 63

4. City of Ontario, California v. Quon
In the United States Supreme Court case City of Ontario, California v. Quon, 64 the city
issued pagers with texting capabilities to members of the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
Team for work related use. 65 Each pager was allotted a set number of characters to send or
receive each month. 66 Jeff Quon worked for the Ontario Police Department as a police sergeant
and SWAT Team member. 67 Quon exceeded the allotted number of characters for several
months until the Lieutenant in charge of the pagers decided to request the transcripts of the
officers’ text messages in order to determine whether the character limit was too low or if the
employees were using the pagers for personal messages. 68 The Lieutenant discovered many of
the messages sent and received on Quon’s pager were not work related, and some were sexually

63

Id. at 33.

64

City of Ontario, California v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010).

65

Id. at 750-51.

66

Id. at 750.

67

Id.

68

Id. at 752.

12

explicit.69 Quon was allegedly disciplined for using his pager for personal messages while on
duty. 70
Quon filed suit against the City of Ontario, California, alleging his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated by the police department obtaining and examining the transcripts of his text
messages. 71 The United States Supreme Court held, “[b]ecause the search was motivated by a
legitimate work-related purpose, and because it was not excessive in scope, the search was
reasonable.” 72

5. United States v. Jones
In the United States Supreme Court case United States v. Jones, 73 the FBI attached a GPS
device to the undercarriage of Antoine Jones’ Jeep Grand Cherokee because they suspected him
of trafficking narcotics. The respondent’s location was tracked by satellite within 50 to 100 feet
for 28 days. 74 The Court held that, “the government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor that vehicle’s movements, constitutes a search.” 75 In

69

Id. at 753.

70

Id.

71

Id.

72

Id. at 764.

73

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).

74

Id. at 947.

75

Id. at 949.
13

Jones, the Court stated that the respondent’s car was one of his “effects” protected under the
Fourth Amendment. 76
Despite the Supreme Court justices agreeing in the opinion, there was disagreement over
what constituted the unconstitutional search: the attachment of the GPS device or the long term
monitoring. The majority opinion held that the attachment of a GPS device to a car was the
violation of Jones’s rights; Justices Alito and Sotomayor concurred. 77 Justice Alito concurred
that Jones’ rights were violated by the monitoring of his movements rather than through the
physical trespass to his vehicle. 78 Justice, Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan joined
Justice Alito in concurring in the judgment. 79 Justice Alito stated:
This case requires us to apply the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures to a 21st-century surveillance technique, the
use of a Global Positioning System (GPS) device to monitor a vehicle's
movements for an extended period of time. Ironically, the Court has chosen to
decide this case based on 18th-century tort law. 80

76

Id.

77

Id. at 945.

78

Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).

79

Id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring).

80

Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).

14

III.

LOWER COURT DECISION IN WURIE AND RILEY

The Supreme Court case, Riley v. California, 81 consolidates two cases; People v. Riley 82
and United States v. Wurie. 83 People v. Riley was decided in the Fourth District Court of Appeals
of California. United States v. Wurie was decided in the First Circuit of the United States Court
of Appeals. The two courts reached opposite holdings on the issue of whether or not cell phones
could be searched incident to arrest. The facts in each case differed in the type information
retrieved from the phone, the type of phone that was searched, and the location of the phone at
the time of the arrest.

A. United States v. Wurie
In United States v. Wurie, the defendant was arrested because he was suspected of being
involved in a drug sale. 84 Upon arrest, the officers took two cell phones from the defendant. One
of the cell phones received repeated phone calls from a number programmed as “my house” as
read from the external screen on the phone. The officers opened the phone and observed that the
phone’s wallpaper was a picture of a young woman with baby. 85 The officers then looked up the
81

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).

82

People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 999, rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
83

United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 999, aff’d, 134 S.
Ct. 2473 (2014).

84

United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 1.

85

Id. at 2.

15

address of the phone number programmed as home and went to that address. They could see a
woman inside who looked like the woman on the phone’s wallpaper and a baby. They then got a
warrant and seized drugs and a firearm from the residence. 86
The First Circuit Court held that the search incident to arrest exception recognized in
Chimel, Robinson, and Gant, did not allow warrantless cell phone searches. It stated, “the searchincident-to-arrest exception does not authorize the warrantless search of a cell phone seized from
an arrestee’s person, because the government has not convinced us that such a search is ever
necessary to protect arresting officers or preserve destructible evidence.” 87 The court reasoned
that it could not justify a warrantless cell phone search based on previous cases regarding a
search incident to arrest because “the officer who conducted the search in Robinson had no way
of knowing what he might find in the cigarette pack, which therefore posed a safety risk. The
officers who searched Wurie’s phone, on the other hand, knew exactly what they would find
therein: data.” 88 The court stated:
In our view . . . what distinguishes a warrantless search of the data within a
modern cell phone from the inspection of an arrestee’s cigarette pack or the
examination of his clothing is not just the nature of the item searched, but the
nature and scope of the search itself. 89

86

Id.

87

Id. at 13.

88

Id. at 10.

89

Id. at 9.

16

B. People v. Riley
In People v. Riley, three gang members standing near the defendant’s Oldsmobile shot at
a car as it drove through an intersection. 90 Later that month, the defendant was driving his Lexus
when he was stopped by the police. The vehicle was impounded because the defendant was
driving with a suspended license; it is departmental policy for an inventory search to be
conducted at impound. 91 Upon searching the arrestee and vehicle, the officers found the gun used
in the shooting and seized the defendant’s cell phone. In addition to the initial search of the cell
phone at the scene, a detective who specialized in gangs examined the phone hours later at the
police station. 92 The cell phone contained picture and videos showing the defendant’s gang
affiliation. 93 The cell phone records showed his phone was used near the scene of the shooting at
around the same time, and near the location where police found his Oldsmobile 30 minutes after
the shooting. 94
In this case, the appellate court held that the warrantless cell phone search was allowed,
relying on the California Supreme Court decision in People v. Diaz which held that the Fourth
Amendment allows police officers to search cell phones incident to arrest without a warrant, as
long as the cell phone is immediately associated with the arrestee’s person. 95 The court in Riley
90

People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 999, rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
91

Id. at *2.

92

Id. at *3.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 505 (Cal. 2011).
17

stated that “a delayed search of an item immediately associated with the arrestee’s person may be
justified as incident to a lawful custodial arrest without consideration as to whether an exigency
for the search exists.” 96

96

People v. Riley, 2013 WL 475242 at *4. There was question as to whether the cell phone was
immediately associated with Riley’s person. Some evidence showed the phone had been
removed from the defendant’s pocket and was on the seat of the car at the time the arrest
occurred. However, due to the phone’s location being a question of fact rather than a question of
law, the appellate court could not rule on this.

18

III.

SUPREME COURT DECISION IN WURIE AND RILEY

On January 17, 2014, the United States Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of
certiorari for both People v. Riley 97 and United States v. Wurie 98 consolidated to the issue of
whether warrantless cell phone searches incident to arrest were constitutional. The Supreme
Court stated, “[t]hese two cases raise a common question: whether the police may, without a
warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been
arrested.” 99
The United States Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision in Riley v. California on
June 25, 2014. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, 100 and Justice Alito
concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. 101 The United States Supreme Court held that a
cell phone search incident to arrest was not constitutional for several reasons. 102

97

People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 999 (2014).
98

United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 999 (2014).

99

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2437, 2480.

100

Id. at 2480.

101

Id. at 2495 (Alito, J., concurring).

102

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. at 2482-95.
19

A. Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court described a smart phone as “a cell phone with a broad
range of other functions based on advanced computing capability, large storage capacity, and
internet connectivity.” 103 In regards to the technological advances in the capabilities of a cell
phone, the Court stated:
Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects
that might be kept on an arrestee's person. The term “cell phone” is itself
misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also
happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone. They could just as easily be
called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries,
diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers. 104
The Supreme Court even went so far as to describe a cell phone as “such a pervasive and
insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an
important feature of human anatomy.” 105
The immense storage capacity of a cell phone alone was enough to make the Supreme
Court question the constitutionality of warrantless cell phone searches. 106 In the past, the search
of an arrestee’s person incident to arrest was limited to the items the arrestee could physically
carry. 107 However, with the modern developments of cell phones the amount of information an

103

Id. at 2480.

104

Id. at 2489.

105

Id. at 2484.

106

Id. at 2489.

107

Id.

20

arrestee could have on the arrestee’s person is virtually limitless. When considering the storage
capacity of a cell phone, the Court stated:
The storage capacity of cell phones has several interrelated consequences for
privacy. First, a cell phone collects in one place many distinct types of
information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video—that
reveal much more in combination than any isolated record. Second, a cell phone's
capacity allows even just one type of information to convey far more than
previously possible. The sum of an individual's private life can be reconstructed
through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions;
the same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet.
Third, the data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the phone, or even
earlier. 108
In addition to considering the quantitative amount of data stored in a cell phone, the
Supreme Court also considered the qualitative content of the information. The Court stated,
“[a]lthough the data stored on a cell phone is distinguished from physical records by quantity
alone, certain types of data are also qualitatively different.” 109 The Court continued by
considering the specific types of qualitative information that could be gathered through the
warrantless search of a cell phone. First, an arrestee’s internet browsing history on an internet
enabled cell phone reveals private interests and concerns. 110 Also, Mobile application software,
or “apps,” provide a wide range tools which can be used in all aspects of a person’s life. 111 The
Supreme Court stated, “[t]he average smart phone user has installed 33 apps, which together can
form a revealing montage of the user’s life.” 112 Finally, many cell phones record historic location
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information as a standard feature. 113 The Court compared this type of tracking to the GPS
monitoring in Jones. 114 Like a GPS tracking device, cell phones can “reconstruct someone’s
specific movements down to the minute, not only around town but also within a particular
building.” 115
In regard to the previously established search incident to arrest exceptions created to
ensure the police officers’ safety and prevent destruction of evidence while making an arrest, the
Supreme Court stated, “[w]hile Robinson’s categorical rule strikes the appropriate balance in the
context of physical objects, neither of its rationales has much force with respect to digital content
on cell phones.” 116 There is no comparable risk of harm to officers or destruction of evidence
when the search is of digital data. 117 Because the search of a cell phone provides a police officer
with such a vast amount of personal information, “[a] search of the information on a cell phone
bears little resemblance to the type of brief physical search considered in Robinson. 118
The United States Supreme Court stated, “[w]e therefore decline to extend Robinson to
searches of data on cell phones, and hold instead that officers must generally secure a warrant
before conducting such a search.” 119
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Law enforcement remains free to examine the physical cell phone to make sure it is not
hiding a weapon; however, “[d]igital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a
weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s escape.” 120 The Court stated
that, “[o]nce any officer has secured a phone and eliminated any potential physical threats,
however, data on the phone can endanger no one.” 121
An argument made in the case was that the ability to search a cell phone could keep a
police officer safe in indirect ways. 122 For example, an officer would have a warning when
others were on the way to meet the arrestee. However, the Court stated that, “neither the United
States nor California offers evidence to suggest their concerns are based on actual
experience.” 123 Also, this proposed consideration broadens Chimel which was concerned with
the arrestee himself accessing a weapon. 124
In regards to preventing the destruction of evidence, the United States Supreme Court
stated, “once law enforcement officers have secured a cell phone, there is no longer any risk that
the arrestee himself will be able to delete incriminating data from the phone.” 125 However, this
may still leave the data vulnerable to remote wiping or data encryption. 126
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As with the rationale of preventing harm to police officers, “these broader concerns about
the loss of evidence are distinct from Chimel’s focus on a defendant who responds to arrest by
trying to conceal or destroy evidence within his reach.” 127 In the case of remote wiping, the
destruction of evidence is typically done by a third party who is not even present at the time of
the arrest. 128 In the case of data encryption, the destruction of evidence is done by the ordinary
operation of the phone’s security features. 129 There was also little evidence to show either
problem is a prevalent issue or that the ability to conduct a warrantless search would make a
difference. 130 The Court continued to point out that there were numerous measures that could be
taken to prevent the destruction of evidence without conducting a warrantless search, and that in
the event an officer truly was presented with a now or never situation to retrieve information the
office could then rely exigent circumstances to search the phone immediately. 131
[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more than the
most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in digital form
many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad
array of private information never found in a home in any form—unless the phone
is. 132
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The privacy interests at stake are further complicated by the fact that much of the data
found in cell phones is not stored on the device itself but in a remote location. 133 In comparison
with Robinson, “[t]reating a cell phone as a container whose contents may be searched incident
to an arrest is a bit strained as an initial matter.” 134 However, the Court continued, “but the
analogy crumbles entirely when a cell phone is used to access data located elsewhere, at the tap
of a screen.” 135 The Supreme Court stated, “[t]he possibility that a search might extend well
beyond papers and effects in the physical proximity of an arrestee is yet another reason that the
privacy interests here dwarf those in Robinson.” 136
It is historically recognized through case law that “the warrant requirement is ‘an
important working part of our machinery of government.’” 137 The Supreme Court stated, “[o]ur
holding, of course, is not that the information on a cell phone is immune from search; it is instead
that a warrant is generally required before such a search, even when a cell phone is seized
incident to arrest.” 138 Despite this denial of the search incident to arrest exception, “other casespecific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular phone.” 139
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With the many capabilities of modern cell phones, “[w]ith all they contain and all they
may reveal, they hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’” 140 The Supreme Court stated:
The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his
hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which
the Founders fought. Our answer to the question of what police must do before
searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a
warrant. 141

B. Concurring Opinion
In the concurring opinion, Justice Alito stated, “I agree with the Court that law
enforcement officers, in conducting a lawful search incident to arrest, must generally obtain a
warrant before searching information stored or accessible on a cell phone.” 142 However, he wrote
separately to address two points.
Justice Alito’s first point was that he was “not convinced at this time the ancient rule on
searches incident to arrest is based exclusively (or even primarily) on the need to protect the
safety of arresting officers and the need to prevent the destruction of evidence.” 143 The rule was
not created until over a century after the Fourth Amendment was adopted. 144 While he agreed
that cell phones should not be searched without a warrant incident to arrest, he did not feel the
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Court should based this decision on the rationale in Chimel. 145 He stated, “I think it is a mistake
to allow that reasoning to affect cases like these that concern the search of the person of
arrestees.” 146 Chimel involved the lawfulness of searching the scene of an arrest, not the items on
an arrestee’s person at the time of the arrest. 147 Once the items are taken away from the arrestee
incident to arrest, the concerns in Chimel are eliminated and therefore, the rationale is
inapplicable. 148
Justice Alito continued by pointing out that this decision is likely to lead to anomalies. 149
He illustrated this anomaly by pointing out that if two defendants are arrested, and the first
defendant has his phone bill in his pocket while the second has his cell phone in his pocket, both
of which contain the record of incriminating phone calls, only the defendant with the physical
record would have the information seized and examined without a warrant. 150 However, Justice
Alito stated he did not see a workable alternative. 151
His second point was that he would reconsider the decision if Congress or a state
legislature were to “enact legislation that draws reasonable distinctions based on categories of
information or perhaps other variables.” 152 Following the Supreme Court decision in Katz,
145
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Congress reacted by enacting Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968. 153 Electronic surveillance has since been primarily governed by the act rather than the
Supreme Court decision. 154
Legislators are in a better position to assess the legitimate needs of law enforcement and
the privacy interests of cell phone owners. 155 Justice Alito stated:
[I]t would be very unfortunate if privacy protection in the 21st century were left
primarily to the federal courts using the blunt instrument of the Fourth
Amendment. Legislatures, elected by the people, are in a better position than we
are to assess and respond to the changes that have already occurred and those that
almost certainly will take place in the future. 156
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IV.

REASONING AND ANALYSIS

A. Cell Phone Use

According to a survey done by the Pew Research Center, 157 ninety-one percent of all
Americans owned a cell phone in 2013. 158 Sixty-one percent of those cell phones are Smart
Phones. 159 Modern cell phones have advanced to do much more than simply make telephone
calls. Society has reached a point where virtually a person’s entire life is likely to be on their cell
phone. Common Smart Phone capabilities include texting, accessing the internet, sending or
receiving emails, taking photographs, downloading apps, navigating, and scheduling.
The same survey by the Pew Research Center showed that eighty-one percent of all cell
phone owners use their phones to send or receive text messages and fifty-two percent of
Americans use their phones to send or receive emails. 160 During a search incident to arrest, these
communications would provide officers with documentation of all written communications made
by the arrestee. With such a large portion of Americans’ communication occurring digitally,
police officers would have access to an immense amount of private information while searching
a cell phone.
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Sixty three percent of all Americans use their cell phone to access the internet. 161 In fact,
accessing the internet via cell phones has become so popular, thirty-four percent of people who
use their cell phones to access the internet say they typically use their cell phone to access the
internet over other any other device such as a laptop, desktop or tablet. 162 This statistic increases
greatly in young adults; half of all internet users between eighteen and twenty nine years old
primarily use the internet on their cell phone. 163 Cell phones keep an internet history, which
would provide police officers with the search and browsing history. For people who conduct
most of their internet use on their cell phone, this would provide police officers with a great deal
of personal information.
The same survey also found that sixty-five percent of Smart Phone users use their phones
to get turn-by-turn navigation or directions while driving. 164 Forty-nine percent of all cell phone
users use their phones to look up direction, recommendations, and other location related
information. 165 In addition to this, most phones record location at all times. According to the
2013 Mobile Consumer Habit survey, 166 seventy two percent of adults in the United States who
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own smart phones keep their phone within five feet of them the majority of the time. 167 This
provides police officers with a GPS location device for nearly every person in the United States;
cell phones have become the modern equivalent of the tracking device used in Jones.
Despite the fact that over half of all Americans now have Smart Phones, only eighteen
percent of Americans sixty five years or older are Smart Phone owners. 168 Seventy-seven percent
do own a cell phone, but these are primarily basic cell phone devices. 169 These numbers are
dramatically contrasted by the fact that seventy-nine percent of Americans between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-four years old, and eighty-one percent of Americans between the ages of
twenty-five and thirty-four years old are Smart Phone owners. 170
There is a striking difference between the uses of cell phones through the different
generations. Ninety-seven percent of Americans between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine
years old, and ninety-four percent between thirty and forty-nine years old send or receive text
messages. 171 These statistics begin to drop with only seventy-five percent of Americans between
fifty and sixty-four years old sending or receiving text messages, but drop drastically with only
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thirty-five percent of Americans sixty-five years and older sending or receiving text messages. 172
Similar drops in use occur with every other studied common cell phone use. 173
The United States Supreme Court Justices range in age from fifty-four to eighty-one
years old. 174 However, in comparison with previous Supreme Court decisions, Riley shows a
much better grasp on the relationship of technology and privacy.

B. Comparison to Prior Supreme Court Cases

The United States Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Riley showed clarity that had
not yet been seen in a United States Supreme Court case regarding the relationship between the
Fourth Amendment and technology. While the decision was a shocking advancement from
previous Supreme Court privacy cases, strands of reasoning from prior cases can be pieced
together in the reasoning of Riley.
Over the past few decades, technology has progressed rapidly. Modern cell phones
combine many different types of technology into one handheld device. There has been a vast
increase in technological capabilities since many of the previous Supreme Court cases involving
technology and privacy. The concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, which involved
surveillance of a phone booth, created the two prong test. In applying the second prong to Riley,
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society would not agree that the warrantless search of a cell phone incident to arrest was
reasonable. Cell phones are such a common item in the United States; Americans would not find
it reasonable to give police officers the right to virtually go through life without a warrant to
justify the search. In Smith, which the was decided in 1979, the United States Supreme Court
held that it was constitutional to install a pen register because the device records such a small
amount of information. A pen register is a device that simply records the telephone numbers
dials from a particular phone; a Smart Phone contains much more communicative information.
Even more recent Supreme Court cases like Quon, which was decided in 2010, involve
technology that is long out of date. The United States Supreme Court was already concerned
with the lack of limitations on the powers of technology to limit constitutional rights when the
Court decided Kyllo in 2011. The decision held that warrantless searches using technology
unavailable to the general public were unconstitutional; however, this led to the question of what
would happen when the technology became readily available. While most Americans have a cell
phone now, twenty years ago they were far from readily available. Finally, the splintered
decision in Jones was reached just two years ago. The clarity in the United Stated Supreme
Court’s decision in Riley shows great improvement in the Justices’ understanding of the
relationship between privacy and technology.

C. Future Application

A United States Supreme Court decision like this one is likely to have many future
applications. Riley v. California found against the majority of the lower courts’ decisions in prior
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cases across the country. 175 Most lower courts had held that cell phone searches incident to arrest
were constitutional. The decision in Riley changed the search policies in police departments
across the country. As a result, it will become more difficult for police to gather evidence against
suspects. Even the United States Supreme Court recognized that its decision would “have an
impact on the ability of law enforcement to combat crime.” 176 However, the Court concluded,
“[p]rivacy comes at a cost.” 177
With technology constantly developing, both the number of devices with Smart Phone
capabilities and the capabilities of typical Smart Phones are continually increasing. Many new
wearable devices are being developed with Smart Phone capabilities. These devices have the
capabilities of a Smart Phone, except they are attached to the user’s person at all times. This
would advance the location data recorded in the device to a precise record of the wearer’s
location at all times. An example of a wearable device that is gaining popularity is the Smart
Watch. Many Smart Watches include fitness applications which record the user’s location, the
rate at which they are moving, and their heart rate. The combination of this information could be
very communicative of a suspect’s activities at the time a crime occurred. Smart Watches will
also advance to include the developing capabilities of Smart Phones. One feature that is
175
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developing in Smart Phones that will affect the decision in Riley v. California is the use of
biometric security. Currently some Smart Phones can be unlocked using the user’s finger print;
however, in the future Smart Phones could use facial recognition or voice recognition to unlock
the phone. This new development could make it more difficult for police officers to unlock a
phone once it has been taken from an arrestee.
In the United States Supreme Court decision, the Justices provided that if there was ever
a situation where officers only had one chance to retrieve information, they may rely on exigent
circumstances to retrieve the information. 178 The United States Supreme Court used exigent
circumstances to “address some of the more extreme hypotheticals that have been suggested.” 179
These hypotheticals included a suspect’s text messages with accomplices regarding detonating a
bomb, and location information in a child abductor’s phone showing the child’s location. 180
However, two arguments brought by the petitioner were much less extreme: remote wiping and
data encryption. 181 The Supreme Court stated there was little evidence to show this was a
prevalent issue; yet this leads to the question of what happens if these now or never
circumstances become the normal circumstances as technology develops.
There have already been some serious issues following the decision. With the constant
development of technology, the assumption in Riley v. California that information can be
retrieved later with a warrant may already be out of date only months after the decision was
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released. 182 On September 18, 2014, Apple, Inc. announced a new privacy policy which states
that the company will no longer unlock iPhones or iPads for police, even if they have a
warrant. 183 It is still possible for police to access data stored in the iCloud with a search warrant,
but iPhone users can easily prevent police from accessing their information by turning off their
phone’s data stream to their iCloud. 184 Changes in technology like this one could cause officers
to always claim exigent circumstances to search a phone incident to arrest due to their inability to
access the information in phones in the future.
The iCloud, and other storage services that keep information in a remote location, raises
another issue with the constitutionality of cell phone searches incident to arrest. These systems
connect all of a user’s devices together, allowing them to access information on their tablet or
laptop from their cell phone. The Court stated, “such a search would be like finding a key in a
suspect's pocket and arguing that it allowed law enforcement to unlock and search a house.” 185
However, it is difficult to tell the difference between data physically stored on the phone and
data stored anywhere in the world. 186
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While the United States Supreme Court decision is clear in its present application, it
leaves many questions unanswered as to the future application. An example of one future issue
with cell phone searches was brought up during the oral arguments when Justice Sotomayor
asked what happens to the data once the cell phone has been searched. 187 There are many future
ramifications which have not been touched upon in Riley so it will be left for future cases, and
potentially legislation, to decide.
These issues lead to the second point of Justice Alito’s concurring opinion; he expressed
his hope that legislation will soon govern the search of cell phones incident to arrest. 188 He stated
that Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
following the decision in Katz. 189 Electronic surveillance is primarily governed by the Act rather
than the Supreme Court decision. 190
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V.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court decision in Riley v. California is a step in the right
direction, but technology is constantly developing at a much faster rate that the Supreme Court
can issue decisions. While this decision will likely be outdated in the very near future, the case
showed the Supreme Court Justices have a much more advanced understanding of technology
and the impact it could have on privacy in the United States than they had in previous cases on
other technology-related matters. The largest impact of Riley could be seen broadly as a potential
turning point at the beginning of a change in the United States’ view on privacy.
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